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Abstract
After the Japanese Financial Crisis in 1990s, the non-performing loan problem was mitigated
in the large Japanese banks but persisted in the regional banking system. By 2004, regional
banks accounted for half of all non-performing loans. In 2004, the government passed the
Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF)4, legislation for capital injections to address
the non-performing loan problem. Aimed at regional banks, the ASFF secured ¥2 trillion in
capital, with various eligibility restrictions and requirements, such as a rigorous debt
restructuring plan. As the Japanese economy and the financial system encountered multiple
external shocks, the government amended the Act several times. Following the shocks,
including the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the Great East Earthquake in 2011, Brexit in
2016, the COVID-19 outbreak of 2020, and the COVID-19 recession in 2021, the government
expanded the ASFF’s scale, extended end dates, and relaxed eligibility and debt restructuring
requirements. The ASFF—originally established to recover the capital adequacy ratios for
banks—eventually turned into a macroprudential tool through amendments that made the
application more accommodative (Sakaguchi 2020, 3). In total, by the end of September
2020, over 30 financial institutions applied and received ¥684.04 billion in capital injections
in the form of preferred shares, subordinated loans and debt, preferred investments, and
trust beneficiary rights. ¥200.5 billion in capital has been recovered to date (DICJ 2020a, 62–
63).
Keywords: capital injection, Japan, Asian Financial Crisis, Resolution and Collection
Corporation, Financial Functions Enhancement Examination Committee

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot
Project modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to broad-based capital
injection programs.
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
3 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
4 The Act on Strengthening Financial Functions is also referred to in Japanese financial crisis literature and
government documents as Act on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Function, or Financial
Functions Strengthening Act, and written as 金融機能強化法 (Kinyuukinoukyokahou) in Japanese.
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Japan’s Act on Strengthening Financial Function
(ASFF)
At a Glance
Following the Japanese financial crisis in
the late 1990s, the Japanese government
introduced a number of crisis-fighting
tools
and
adopted
restructuring
frameworks. In 2002, the disposal of bad
loans became a priority for the Japanese
government under Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi (Koizumi 2002).
Former
chair
of
the
Financial
Reconstruction
Committee
Hakuo
Yanagisawa had chaired the Japanese
Financial Services Agency (JFSA) until that
point but was dismissed because of lack of
progress in resolving the non-performing
loan (NPL) problem. Yanagisawa was
replaced by Heizo Takenaka, who
enforced what came to be known as the
Takenaka Plan, one of the most
controversial financial policies adopted in
Japan (Himino 2021). While the details of
the Takenaka Plan did not differ
significantly from the previous plan, it was
characterized by stricter enforcement of
restructuring policies (Hoshi and Ito
2004). Under Takenaka, many big banks
improved their capital ratios and stock
prices increased (Hoshi and Kashyap
2010; Himino 2021).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose:
“In an environment where financial
institutions had difficulty in securing financing on their
own, provide sufficient funding through capital
participation via public fund injection so that the
financial sector can voluntarily commit to risk taking
and function as financial intermediaries in the regional
economy” (Endo 2013).
Announcement Date

June 14, 2004

Operational Date

August 1, 2004

Injection Start Date

September 2006

End of Application
Window

March 2026 (after the
amendment in June 2020)

Program Size

Originally ¥2 trillion, now
expanded to ¥15 trillion
after the amendment in
June 2020

Eligibility

Banks and designated
nonbanks

Administrator

The Deposit Insurance
Corporation of Japan
(DICJ)
Resolution and Collection
Corporation of Japan (RCC,
the subsidiary of the DICJ)

Legal Authority

Passed through the
Japanese Diet, executed by
the Prime Minister’s Office

Key Features

SME lending focus
Merger and acquisitions
focus (after May 2021
amendment)
Multiple amendments with
end date extensions, size
expansions, and more
generous debt
restructuring
requirements

However, while large city banks improved
their capital ratios, regional banks lagged
in disposing of nonperforming loans (IMF
2004). Regional banks were exempted
from the government policy requiring a
halving of the NPL ratio (Koizumi 2002).
As of March 2003, Barclays estimated
regional banks accounted for 54 percent of system-wide NPLs, amounting to ¥23.8 trillion.
By January 2004, the Japanese government determined regional banks to be a priority for
financial stability (Hirano 2004).
In January 2004, in response to the burgeoning NPL problem within the regional banks, the
Prime Minister’s Cabinet submitted the Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF) to
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the Japanese Diet, earmarking ¥2 trillion for public capital injections into regional banks
(House of Representatives, Japan 2004). FSA Chair Heizo Tanaka commented that regional
banks would be inspected as strictly as national banks under previous public capital
injections (Hirano 2004). The bill was discussed between January and June, and on June 14,
2004, the Japanese Diet passed the bill, two days before the end of the 159th Diet Session
(House of Representatives, Japan 2004). The amount, price, capital characteristics, and the
timing of the capital injection under the ASFF varied across financial institutions, tailored to
each institution’s needs.
Following the original legislation in 2004, the government made a series of amendments to
the legislation to utilize the capital injection framework for various purposes.
First, in September 2008, the collapse of Lehman Brothers created the impetus to pass
legislation to support the Japanese economy. Then Prime Minister Aso announced the
Comprehensive Immediate Policy Package to Ease Public Anxiety (Aso 2008). The package
focused on improving small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing, with a series of
policy measures intended to improve economic well-being with several fiscal targets (Endo
2013). Under these measures, the Diet passed the first amendment to the ASFF, relaxing
some eligibility and debt restructuring requirements, extending the sunset date from the end
of March 2008 to March 2012, and expanding the size from ¥2 trillion to ¥12 trillion (FSA
2008).
Second, in March 2011, an earthquake of unprecedented scale—9.0 in magnitude—struck
the northern coast of Japan. Immediately following, the Prime Minister’s office added line
items to the supplementary budget for disaster relief efforts (Noda 2011). Four months later,
the Diet passed an amendment to the existing recapitalization legislation with special clauses
for regional institutions supporting the revitalization of areas affected by the earthquake and
extended the sunset date to the end of the March 2017 (House of Representatives, Japan
2011; Endo 2013).
Third, in 2016, Japan held the presidency of the G7 countries. During this presidency, the UK
public voted to leave the EU. To show leadership, the Japanese government led the G7 in
preparing for potential financial stability implications resulting from Brexit. The government
proposed another amendment to the act to prepare for the risks arising from Brexit by
continuing to support the growth of SMEs; this time the government amended the sunset
date to the end of March 2022. The amended bill passed the diet on December 2, 2016 (Abe
2016; House of Representatives, Japan 2016).
Fourth, in 2020, upon the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the Japanese Diet
passed another amendment to the ASFF. On June 13, the Diet extended the period of public
capital injections to financial institutions for an additional four years, to the end of 2026. The
amended bill also proposed the expansion of the available public funds for the injection from
¥12 trillion to ¥15 trillion (House of Representatives, Japan 2020). In proposing the new
amendment, Taro Aso, the Minister of State for Financial Services emphasized that the
domestic financial system was sound and that the amendment was a preemptive measure
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ensuring the long-run soundness of the financial system so that it could continue to support
SMEs impacted by the COVID-19 crisis and revitalize the economy (Aso 2020).
The fifth and most recent amendment to the ASFF was passed by the Diet on March 5, 2021
and was implemented on May 19, 2021. The Japanese Diet explained that the purpose of the
amendment was to maintain financial functions that support the recovery and revitalization
of regional economies (rural areas) in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Citing
declining populations in those regional areas, regional banks that plan to merge or acquire
other banks may submit "implementation plans” to receive capital injections (FSA 2021).
The declining population and its negative impact on regional economies and the financial
system have long been a concern for Japan. For instance, the Bank of Japan’s April 2017
Financial System Report raised concerns about declining profitability of financial
institutions, noting that the consequences of a declining population and other macro factors
could lead to potential vulnerabilities (Bank of Japan 2017). In November 2020, the Bank of
Japan also introduced the “Special Deposit Facility to Enhance the Resilience of the Regional
Financial System,” a program to promote cost savings, mergers, and other acquisitions
within regional banks (Bank of Japan 2020).
Figure 1 below summarizes the evolution of ASFF and participation data.
Figure 1: Evolution of the Act on Strengthening Financial Functions
June 2004

Reason
for To restore both
domestic and
implementation
foreign confidence
/amendment

in Japan’s financial
system by
disposing of NPLs
on the balance
sheets of financial
institutions

Size (in JPY)

¥2 trillion

Dec 2008
Amendment

June 2011
Amendment

The Global
Financial Crisis

The Great East
Earthquake

To revitalize
regional
economies by
strengthening
financial
functions
through central
government’s
capital
participation to
the financial
sector

To maintain and
enhance financial
functions in the
affected areas
and
provide comfort
to the depositors

Expanded to
¥12 trillion

No
amendment
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Dec 2016
Amendm
ent
The risk
from
Brexit

June 2020
Amendment

May 2021
Amendment

The COVID-19
pandemic

The COVID-19
pandemic and the
struggling regional
economies

To strengthen
regional banks’
financial
intermediary
function of
supporting
cash flow and
promoting the
equity
financing of
companies
(Aso 2020)
No
amendme
nt

Expanded to
¥15 trillion

To strengthen the
post-COVID-19
regional economies

No amendment

Japan’s Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF)

Debt
restructuring
plan

Eligibility

Unnava and Oguri

Various
requirements
including:
-Numerical targets
for profitability
and efficiency
-Plans to achieve
the numerical
targets
-Plans to facilitate
credit to SMEs
Measures to
achieve numerical
targets
-Establishment of a
responsible
management
system
-Plan period
(within 3 years)
-Banks which
capital ratios are
below the
regulatory ratio
will need to pursue
management
responsibility upon
application
-Pursue
management
responsibility if
targets are not met

Relaxation of
conditions:
-Banks which
capital ratios
are below the
regulatory ratio
will NOT need
to pursue
management
responsibility
upon
application
-NOT Pursue
management
responsibility if
targets are not
met

Introduced the
following special
exceptions and
requirements for
the earthquake
impacted
financial
institutions:
-Exempt banks
from the
requirement to
set numerical
targets and
establish a
responsible
management
system.
-Exempt banks
from the
requirement to
facilitate credit
to SMEs
-Extend the plan
period to five
years at most
-Require banks
to report
facilitating
credit to disaster
victims

No
amendme
nt

The government
screened the
applications based
on the following
categories:
- Expected to
improve
profitability and
efficiency
-Supporting SMEs
in regional
economy
-Restructuring
efforts
-Repayment
expected within
approximately 15
years
The financial
institutions must
be vital for the
regional economy

The following
items are
excluded from
the screening
requirements:
-Restructuring
efforts

Introduced the
following special
exceptions and
requirements for
the earthquake
impacted
financial
institutions:
-Excluded
profitability and
efficiency
requirements
-Excluded
repayment
expectation
within 15 years
-The financial
institutions need
not to be vital for
the regional
economy

No
amendme
nt
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Introduced the
following
special
exceptions and
requirements
for the COVID19 impacted
financial
institutions:
-Exempt banks
from the
requirement to
set numerical
targets and
establish a
responsible
management
system.
-Exempt banks
from the
requirement to
facilitate credit
to SMEs
-Extend the
plan period to
five years at
most
-Require banks
to report
facilitating
credit to
COVID-19
victims
COVID-19
impacted
financial
institutions
will be subject
to the same
exceptions as
the earthquake
impacted
financial
institutions

Introduced the
following special
exceptions and
requirements for
financial
institutions that
would undergo
mergers and
management
integration

Regional financial
institutions that
would undergo
mergers and
management
integration will be
subject to the
special treatment

Journal of Financial Crises

Capital
Characteristics

End date

preferred shares,
trust beneficiary
rights, and
common stock for
those financial
institutions which
capital ratios are
below the
regulatory
requirements
End of March 2008

# of Financial
Institutions
2
participating

Injected
(in JPY)

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

No amendment

the earthquake
impacted
financial
institutions have
the option of
subordinated
loans /bonds in
addition to
common shares,
preferred shares.
The dividend
rate is adjusted.

No
amendme
nt

End of March
2012

End of March
2017

End of
March
2022

End of March
2026

11

21 (including 13
financial
institutions that
are designated as
“Great East
Earthquake
impacted”)

2

-

-

¥309 billion

¥315.34 billion

¥19.2
billion

-

-

capital
¥40.5billion

COVID-19
impacted
financial
institutions
will be subject
to the same
treatment as
the earthquake
impacted
financial
institutions.
No amendment

Notes: Data as of June 2021, and participation and injection data as of September 2020.
Source: Sakaguchi 2020; FSA 2021; 2008; 2011b; House of Representatives, Japan 2004; 2011; 2020.

Summary Evaluation
Though the program became operational on August 1, 2004, it remained unutilized until two
years later, when Kiyo Bank and Howa Bank became the first banks to apply for injection in
August 2006. The banks received capital in in November and December of 2006,
respectively. The banks requested ¥39 billion total, with Kiyo bank requesting ¥30 billion
and Howa Bank requesting ¥9 billion. They eventually received ¥40.5 billion, with Kiyo Bank
receiving an additional ¥1.5 billion more than requested (DICJ 2020b).
After the amendment to the ASFF in 2008, 11 additional financial institutions participated
the scheme, receiving a total of ¥309 billion. After a second amendment in 2011, which also
extended the application period, an additional 21 institutions participated in the injection,
receiving ¥309.1 billion (of which 13 financial institutions were designated as “Great East
Japan Earthquake impacted financial institutions”). In December 2016, the Japanese
government extended of the application period again, through March 31, 2022. Since
December 2016, two institutions have applied, receiving ¥16.24 billion yen. The evolution
of the law and its utilization can be seen above in Figure 1.
Thirty institutions participated in the capital injection scheme, with some institutions
participating multiple times. As of the end of September 2020, the Japanese government had
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¥684.04 billion capital injected, and ¥200.5 billion has been repaid so far, leaving ¥483.54
billion the remaining balance. (See Figure 2 below.) (DICJ 2020b).
Figure 2: ASFF Cumulative Injections and Repurchases
¥ billion
800
600

injected
¥ 483.54
billion

400
200
0
-200
-400

repaid/repurchased

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
amendment

amendment

amendment

amendment

Preferred Shares (convertible)

Subordinated Loans

Preferred Investments

Trust Beneficial Rights

Repaid Subordinated Loans

Repaid Preferred Shares

Remaining Balance Injected

Source: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan n.d.

Of financial institutions that participated in the capital injection program, five have repaid or
repurchased shares either partially or in full (77 Bank, Kiyo Bank, Howa Bank, North Pacific
Bank, and Kirayaka Bank). Both Howa Bank and Kiyo Bank repurchased their preferred
shares within 10 years of the capital injection. Under the extension made during the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy, two of the remaining 28 banks, North Pacific Bank and Kirayaka Bank,
repurchased their preferred shares. Only one bank in the subsequent extensions, 77 Bank,
has repaid the amount injected. (See Figure 3).
There is still a substantial amount of capital outstanding from the series of capital injections.
The capital injection framework was utilized most during the Global Financial Crisis and in
the aftermath of the Great East Japan earthquake. The Fukushima region has seen an
economic recovery, but it is unclear the extent to which the regional banking sector played a
role. Similarly, while banks have utilized the legislation after the amendment concerning
Brexit was passed, it has been unclear the repercussions Brexit will have on financial stability
and regional banking needs, and so far no banks have applied the capital injection since the
COVID-19 2020 amendment.
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Figure 3: Repayment Status

Which
ASFF?

June 2004
version
(original)

After Dec
2008
Amendment

After June
2011
Amendment

Name of
Financial
Institution

Beginning
of
Conversion
Period

Injection
Month
Year

Capital
Characteristics

Nov-06

Preferred
Shares
(convertible)

Dec-06

Preferred
Shares
(convertible)

North
Pacific
Bank

Mar-09

Preferred
Shares
(convertible)

1-Jan-13

Jimoto HD
(Kirayaka
Bank)*

Sep-09

Preferred
Shares
(convertible)

Towa
Bank

Dec-09

77
Bank***

Dec-11

Kiyo HD
(Kiyo
Bank)*
Howa
Bank**

Preferred
Shares
(convertible)
Subordinated
loan
(10 years
three months)

Mandatory
Acquisition Date
for Preferred
Shares

Fully
repaid?

Repayment Details

1-Oct-11

1-Oct-16

Y

Repurchased ¥15.4 billion (out of ¥31.5 billion, repurchase
amount: ¥16.66 billion) in Sep 2012. Repurchased the
remaining ¥16.1billion (repurchase amount: ¥18.101
billion) in Sep 2013.

1-Apr-08

To be decided by
the board of
directors on or
after April 2, 2020

Y

Repurchased in full (repurchase amount: ¥9.144 billion) in
Mar 2014. The issuer also received capital participation of
¥16 billion.

1-Apr-24

Y

Repurchased in full (repurchase amount: ¥9.144 billion) in
Mar 2014. The issuer also received capital participation of
¥16 billion. Repurchased the remaining ¥70 billion
(repurchase amount: ¥81.088 billion) in Mar 2014.

1-Oct-10

1-Oct-24

Y

Repurchased in full (repurchase amount: ¥20.078 billion) in
Dec 2012. Implemented along with the issuance of new
preferred shares totaling ¥20 billion.

29-Dec-10

29-Dec-24

N

Partially repurchased ¥20 billion (out of ¥35 billion,
repurchase amount: ¥22.744 billion) in Mar 2018.

NA

NA

Y

Exercised the option to repay in full in June 2015.

* Names of financial institutions in parenthesis refer to the entities that effectively received capital participation.
** Preferred Shares with voting rights to appoint or dismiss directors.
*** Earthquake-impacted financial institution.
Source: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan n.d.
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Japan Context 2004 - 2006
GDP
$5.02 trillion in 2004
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$4.56 trillion in 2005
USD)
$4.58 trillion in 2006
GDP per capita
$37,689 in 2004
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$37,218 in 2005
USD)
$35,434 in 2006
Data for Q4 2004:
Fitch: AAMoody’s: A2
S&P: AASovereign credit rating (Five-year senior
debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Data for Q4 2005:
Fitch: AAMoody’s: A2
S&P: AAData for Q4 2006:
Fitch: AAMoody’s: A2
S&P: AA$7.37 trillion in 2004
$6.77 trillion in 2005
$6.93 trillion in 2006
146.8% in 2004
148.5% in 2005
151.2% in 2006
46.9% in 2004
47.7% in 2005
50.0% in 2006
52.4% in 2004
51.9% in 2005
51.4% in 2006
Data not available for 2004–06
Data not available for 2004–06
Yes in 2004–06

Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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The original Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF) was passed as a stand-alone package,
without any other accompanying legislation (Hirano 2004; House of Representatives, Japan 2004).5
Meanwhile, it can be regarded as one of the components in the series of broad-based capital
injections throughout the Japanese financial crisis. As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the Financial
Function Stabilization Act and the Prompt Recapitalization Act in 1998 were the two broad-based
capital injection frameworks that preceded the ASFF.
Figure 4: Timeline of YPFS Japanese Broad-Based Capital Injection Cases

Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: The Japanese government originally passed the Act on Strengthening
Financial Functions (ASFF) as a stand-alone package. Later amendments to the ASFF
were incorporated as part of various policy packages, often responding to the external
macroeconomic shocks, and it eventually evolved into a macroprudential policy tool.

Feb: Financial Function
Stabilization Act enacted
(Unnava, 2021)
Oct: Prompt Recapitalization
Act enacted (Unnava, 2021)

1998

2000
May: The amendment
to the Deposit
Insurance Law

Dec: Special Measures
Law for the Promotion
of Financial
Institutions
Reorganization
enacted

2002

March: Provision of
Subordinated Loans
for Major Japanese
Banks announced by
BOJ (Kawana, 2021)

2004

2008

June: ASFF enacted

2009

Dec: ASFF amended

June: ASFF amended

2011
June: ASFF amended

2016
Dec: ASFF amended

2020

2021
May: ASFF amended

Source: Authors’ analysis

Some consider the ASFF as part of the Program for Financial Revival or the Financial Reconstruction Program, a
framework established in October 2002 to reduce non-performing loans (Matsubayashi 2015, 20; Endo 2013). In July
2003, a public discussion paper on the public capital injection scheme was published, and the ASFF was eventually
designed under the discussed frameworks (Oomori 2017, 3–4; Financial Function Enhancement Examination
Committee 2003).
5
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Figure 5: Summary and Timeline of Japanese Capital Injection Frameworks

Feb
1998

Financial Function Stabilization Act6 (Unnava 2021a)
(Broad-based Capital Injection Scheme)
¥1.8 trillion was injected in subordinated debt and loans and preferred shares.
Three out of 21 participating banks were regional banks (Bank of Yokohama, Hokuriku Bank, and
Ashikaga bank).
By 2017, all banks had repurchased their shares, loans, and debts.
Most banks received a similar amount of capital (approximately ¥100 billion) simultaneously in
March 1998.
The application window closed in March 2003.

Oct
1998

Prompt Recapitalization Act7 (Unnava 2021 b)
(Broad-based Capital Injection Scheme)
Between 1998-2001, ¥8.6 trillion capital was injected in in subordinated debt and loans and preferred
shares.
The underwriting terms, size, and timing of the capital injection were tailored to each banks’ needs.
The application window closed in March 2001.

May
2000

Deposit Insurance Act (measures against financial crisis)
(Ad-hoc Capital Injection Scheme)
While Financial Function Stabilization Act and Prompt Recapitalization Act had clear sunset dates, the
amendment of the Deposit Insurance Act enabled ad-hoc capital injections to solvent banks under
Article 102 (1).
Under this amended Act, Resona Bank received an ad-hoc capital injection of ¥1,960 billion in June
2003.

Dec
2002

Organizational Restructuring Act
(Ad-hoc Capital Injection Scheme)
This new law enabled the government ad-hoc capital injection to merging and restructuring banks
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which capital adequacy ratios are below the requirement.
Under this new Act, Kanto Tsukuba Bank received ¥6.0 billion in September 2003.

June
2004
Dec
2008

Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF) and further amendments
(Broad-based Capital Injection Scheme)

June
2011
Dec
2016
June
2020
May
2021
Source: Authors’ analysis

However, compared to other schemes, the ASFF is a unique preemptive broad-based capital
injection scheme, targeting regional banks8 and cooperatives9. The ASFF was established to focus
more on the regional banking sector, which was not necessarily the focus of the previous schemes
(Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010).
Subsequent amendments were sometimes packed with other economic or financial policies. For
instance, the amendment in 2008 corresponded with economic policies at the Enterprise
Turnaround Initiative Corporation of Japan and the SME Revitalization Support Councils (Hatanaka
2012; Endo 2013). Furthermore, the JFSA and media often emphasized the coordination of the
COVID-19 related ASFF 2020 amendment and the Special Act under the Anti-Trust Law (FSA 2020).
Lastly, the most recent amendment in June 2021 was paired with revisions in other laws; one
banking law revision eased restrictions on the scope of bank's business and equity investments, and

金融機能安定化法 in Japanese, cited as Act on Emergency Measures for Financial Functions Stabilization (Former
Financial Functions Stabilization Act) on the DICJ website.
6

早期健全化法(Soukikenzenkahou) in Japanese, cited as Act on Emergency Measures for Early Strengthening of
Financial Functions (Early Strengthening Act) on the DICJ website.
8 In Japan, there are first-tier regional banks, which operate in one or a few prefectures, and second-tier regional
banks, which are smaller than first-tier regional banks and operate mainly within a prefecture. In this YPFS case, we
call both “regional banks”.
9 Cooperatives include those operating within a prefecture and specializing in small and medium-sized enterprise
loans, so-called shinkin, community-based credit union, so-called shinkumi, etc.
7
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another investment law was intended to promote overseas investors’ participation in Japanese
financial markets (Jiji Press 2021).
2. Legal Authority: The Japanese Diet formally passed the ASFF.
In January 2004, in response to the burgeoning nonperforming loan issue at regional banks, the
Prime Minister’s Cabinet submitted the Act on Strengthening Financial Functions to the Japanese
Diet, earmarking ¥2 trillion for public capital injections into regional banks. On June 14, 2004, the
Japanese Diet finally passed the bill, two days before the end of the 159th Diet Session (House of
Representatives, Japan 2004). Each subsequent amendment passed through the Diet successfully
as well.
3. Communication: The Prime Minister’s office publicly announced each recapitalization
bill and subsequent amendments; the Diet debated each publicly before passing the bills
and amendments.
The Prime Minister’s office publicly announced each recapitalization bill and the subsequent
amendments. The Diet debated each bill and amendment publicly before officially passing them.
Occasionally, the Minister of State for Financial Service also released official statements.
4. Governance and Administration: The ASFF capital injection framework involves
ministers from a number of relevant ministries, the prime minister, the Financial
Function Enhancement Examination Committee, and the Deposit Insurance Corporation
of Japan (DICJ).
Multiple stakeholders are involved in the ASFF capital injection scheme, including ministers from
relevant ministries, prime minister, the Financial Function Enhancement Examination Committee
(Committee), and the DICJ.
The Japanese Financial Services Agency (JFSA), under the Ministry of Finance, was tasked to form
the Committee 10 to assess applications and oversee the implementation of the plans for the
recapitalization (House of Representatives, Japan 2004, 48). The Committee consisted of part-time
members appointed by the prime minister serving three-year terms (House of Representatives,
Japan 2004, 49,51). The maximum number of members is 6 people (The House of Representatives,
Japan 2021). The JFSA website hosts the Committee’s meeting minutes soon after the meeting and
transcripts are publicly disclosed three years after meetings (Financial Function Enhancement
Examination Committee 2004, 5). As of June 2021, according to the JFSA website, the Committee
has met 25 times over the span of the ongoing recapitalization (Financial Service Agency, n.d.).
The Committee evaluates the management enhancement plan submitted by the applicant financial
institutions. The involved ministers—including the Commissioner of JFSA or the Minister of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, depending on the type of the financial institution, the Minister

This committee has also been referred to as the “Banking Function Reinforcement Study Council” and the
“Examination Committee for Strengthening Financial Functions”, referred as 金 融 機 能 強 化 審 査 会
(Kinyuukinoukyoukashinsakai) in Japanese.
10
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of Finance, and prime minister—receive reports. The ministers also have the right to approve or
request exercise rights, including conversions. Voting rights are only exercised if the banks with
preferred shares do not pay their dividends (see Key Design Decision #11 for further detail)
(Sakaguchi 2020).11
The DICJ entrusts the operation of capital participation, management, and disposal to the RCC, a
subsidiary of the DICJ. The RCC 12 was created as a merger between the Housing Loan
Administration Corporation and the Resolution and Collection Bank on April 1, 1999, under the
Financial Revitalization Act. The RCC is funded entirely by the DICJ (DICJ 2020a). The DICJ acts
independently of the Bank of Japan or the Treasury, though in close cooperation (Financial Stability
Board 2016).
The RCC has been responsible for managing capital and making purchases as determined by the
Committee. Funded by the DICJ, the RCC purchased either preferred stocks, subordinated bonds and
debt, preferred investments, or trust beneficiary rights from the financial institutions that applied
for capital injections under the ASFF (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010).
The actual capital injection operations vary based on the characteristics of the financial institutions
applying for the injection. For instance, the support for financial institutions undergoing
restructuring is different than that of institutions that are not undergoing restructuring. Also, nonbanks (e.g., cooperative structured central financial institutions) and banks that are affected by
earthquakes or COVID-19 receive a different treatment in application, screening, and funding (DICJ
2020a).
5. Size: The original ASFF, as passed in June 2004, set the DICJ’s Financial Functions
Strengthening Account to ¥2 trillion. As the Act was amended multiple times, the size
grew to ¥15 trillion.
When the ASFF was passed in June 2004, the DICJ;s Financial Functions Strengthening Account had
a budget of ¥2 trillion. As the Act was amended over the years, the size expanded to ¥15 trillion. So
far, as of the end of September 2020, the Japanese government had utilized ¥684.04 billion in
capital, only 4.5% of the full capacity (DICJ 2020b).
6. Timing: Each financial institution received capital once its application (including the
management plan) had been screened by the Financial Function Enhancement
Examination Committee and accepted by the Japanese government.
Unlike the Prompt Recapitalization Act or other past capital injection frameworks, each financial
institution received their capital on their own application timeframe, and there was no coordinated
schedule across the various financial institutions. Each financial institution received capital once its

So far, Howa Bank (received capital in December 2006) has been the only bank that borrowed capital in preferred
shares with voting rights to appoint or dismiss directors (DICJ 2020b).
12 For more information regarding the RCC and its operations, please refer to the “Resolution and Collection
Corporation” YPFS case study (Dreyer 2021).
11
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application (including the management plan) had been screened by the Financial Function
Enhancement Examination Committee and accepted by the Japanese government.
7. Source of Injections: The DICJ’s Financial Functions Strengthening Account is funded
through the issuance of government-backed DICJ bonds, borrowings from financial
institutions or other investors, and in rare instances, directly from the Bank of Japan.
The DICJ holds the Financial Functions Strengthening Account, which is specifically dedicated for
the ASFF. Under Article 29, paragraph (1) of the ASFF Act, the DICJ’s Financial Functions
Strengthening Account is funded through the issuance of government-backed DICJ bonds and
borrowings from financial institutions, other investors, and in rare instances, directly from the Bank
of Japan (Financial Stability Board 2016; DICJ 2020a). Under Article 45 of the ASFF, the government
guarantees the account (Financial Stability Board 2016; DICJ 2020a).13 The extent to which DICJ
funded the ASFF recapitalization from either source is shown in Figure 6 below.
Figure 6: Funding Status of the Financial Functions Strengthening Account
¥ billion
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Note: Years in Japanese fiscal year (April – March next year).

DICJ bond issuances and borrowings are subject to ceilings set out in the Deposit Insurance Act
and are complemented by annual budgetary appropriations (as approved by the Diet) for the
amount guaranteed by the government. (Financial Stability Board 2016). The government
guarantee ceiling was ¥12 trillion in the budget for fiscal year 2020 and ¥15 trillion for the second
supplementary budget for fiscal year 2020 (DICJ 2020a).
13
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Source: DICJ 2020a.

Meanwhile, the funding source for financial institutions that undergo mergers and management
integration under the ASFF capital injection scheme introduced in May 2021 is slightly different.
The revised ASFF now provides approximately a third of the initial cost of system integration and
branch consolidation, accounting for about ¥3 billion (Nikkei 2021; Jiji Press 2021).
8. Eligible Institutions: Initially, all financial institutions—both banks and non-banks—
were eligible for the ASFF application but were required to target SME financing in
regional economy. In later amendments, the ASFF established special treatment for
financial institutions that were affected by the Great East Earthquake (June 2011
Amendment), by the COVID-19 (June 2020 Amendment), and that undergo mergers and
management integration (May 2021 Amendment).
Unlike some of the previous recapitalizations, the ASFF did not require financial institutions to be
of systemic importance to receive capital injections using public funds. The Committee accepts
applications from financial institutions that fail to fulfill the capital adequacy requirements (but are
not bankrupt or insolvent) or financial institutions that meet the capital adequacy requirements but
intend to undertake a fundamental organizational restructuring (Ikenaga and Watanabe 2008).
Any domestic or foreign bank was eligible for capital injection; however, no foreign banks
participated (Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan 2020b).
The law did not require the participation of any banks, and the application was voluntarily. It did
allow the participation of specific non-banks, listed explicitly: Norinchukin Bank, the Long-Term
Credit Bank, the Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives, Fisheries Cooperative Association, and the
Federation of Fisheries Processing Cooperatives. The law also allowed the participation of shinkin
banks, labor unions, credit cooperatives (shinkumi), and bank holding companies (House of
Representatives, Japan 2004).14
Furthermore, after the amendment in 2008, the focus on SMEs in the regional economy intensified
(Ikenaga and Watanabe 2008). After the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008,
the Japanese government proposed the Comprehensive Immediate Policy Package to Ease Public
Anxiety, with fears over how global economic events might lead to a credit crunch for SMEs (Aso
2008; Yamori et al. 2013). In the new iteration of the program, the facilitation of credit to SMEs
became a special focus in management plans submitted. The amendment extended the period for
application from March 31, 2008 to March 31, 2012.
Following the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Diet passed an amendment to the existing
recapitalization legislation with special clauses for regional institutions supporting the

The amendment of 2008 newly created an injection scheme for the Central Organization of Cooperative Structured
Financial Institution, enabling easier access to capital support to each non-banks as well as reinforcing the financial
soundness of the for the Central Organization of Cooperative Structured Financial Institution (Ikenaga and Watanabe
2008).
14
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revitalization of areas affected by the earthquake (FSA 2011a). In this amendment, the Japanese
government extended the application period for capital injections, in addition to creating special
treatment for those institutions impacted by the Great East Japan Earthquake. Similarly, the June
2020 amendment established special treatment for financial institutions that were affected by
COVID-19.
The affected institution can apply for a capital injection without being screened for the feasibility of
the targets in the management plan or feasibility of repayment within 15 years (Rhee and Unnava
2020). Affected institutions are those whose “financial statements have gotten considerably worse
due to the coronavirus or measures to prevent coronavirus, or if the financial institution needs to
lend to companies that are affected by coronavirus or measures to prevent coronavirus” (Rhee and
Unnava 2020). Sakaguchi (2020) assumes that eventually all financial institutions should fall under
these criteria.
Lastly, the 2021 amendment related to COVID-19 covers approximately one-third of initial costs
related to business integration, including system and branch consolidations for those financial
institutions undergoing mergers and organizational restructuring (Jiji Press 2021). While the
promotion of mergers and reorganization is similar the Organizational Restructuring Act (a capital
injection scheme that was established in December 2002), financial institutions can apply for the
capital injection even when their capital adequacy ratios are above the requirement. According to
the revised Act, financial institutions that wish to receive capital for system and branch
consolidations will submit an “implementation plan,” indicating their outlook for the reorganization
and contribution to the regional economy (The House of Representatives, Japan 2021).
9. Individual Participation Limits: No explicit statement limiting individual participation
was found in the legal documents.
No explicit statement limiting individual participation was found in the legal documents. As of
September 2020, the largest capital injected was ¥100 billion (North Pacific Bank in March 2009),
and the mean and median of the capital received were ¥18.5 billion and ¥15 billion, respectively
(DICJ 2020b).
10. Capital Characteristics: The capital characteristics were determined on a case-by-case
basis; thus far, 18 financial institutions received capital in the form of convertible
preferred shares, 13 in trust beneficial rights, five in preferred investments, and one in
subordinated loans. No financial institution has received capital in the form of common
shares, though it is an available option in certain circumstances.
The capital characteristics and terms were decided on a case-by-case basis (DICJ 2020b). Ultimately,
the Committee utilized a combination of preferred shares, subordinated debt, priority investment,
and trust beneficiary rights for capital injections over the multiple injection windows.
So far, 18 banks received capital in the form of convertible preferred shares, 13 non-banks in trust
beneficial rights, five non-banks in preferred investments, and one bank in the form of a
subordinated loan (DICJ 2020b). No financial institution has received in capital support in the form
of common shares, though it is an option if the financial institution’s capital ratio is below the
regulatory requirement (Aso 2008; House of Representatives, Japan 2004; FSA 2008; House of
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Representatives, Japan 2011; 2016; Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan 2020a). A detailed
table listing of the characteristics and the terms for capital is available in the Appendix.
11. Term/Dividends/Pricing: Terms were proposed by the applicant institutions via
management plans, which were then considered by the Committee.
Applicant institutions proposed terms via their management plans, which were then considered by
the Committee (Financial Service Agency, n.d.; House of Representatives, Japan 2004). A detailed
table listing of the characteristics and the terms for capital is available in the Appendix.
It appears that financial institutions proposed granular terms in their plans—including repayment
dates, dividend rates, and instruments to be used for injection—which were then reviewed by the
Committee. These terms were presented to members in the Committee meetings and then approved
or rejected. There appear to have been no rejections of financial institution applications at any point,
including the revisions to management plans after the plan periods ended.
Management plans were evaluated along several criteria, listed in Figure 7 below.
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Figure 7: Evaluation Criteria for Management Enhancement Plans
Category

Evaluation Strategy

Notes

Strategies for Achieving Goals

- Streamline operations
- Dispose of assets unnecessary for operations
or unprofitable
- Specialize in profitable areas

Establishing a Responsible
Management System

- Appoint new external members to the board
- Strengthen the independence of those
members

Improving the Legal Compliance
System

- Create a committee of lawyers, certified
public accountants, and other third parties
specifically to improve compliance with
existing laws
- Improve the internal audit system

Ensuring Objectivity of
Management Evaluations

Note that cooperatives should
- Establish a third-party committee to evaluate
follow management guidance by
management
the central cooperative
- Use performance-based compensation
institution.

- Improving disclosure each quarter
- Provide clearer and richer information on
Improving Information Disclosure profits and losses
- Increase information on contributions to the
regional economy of the financial institution
Management Accountability if
Goals are not Achieved

- Providing a clear statement that management
will retire

Defining Management and
Shareholder Liability

- Noting the representing officer submitting a
request for capital will resign immediately if
the Financial Function Enhancement
Examination Committee decides to give capital
to the financial institution
- Clarifying the financial institution will not
request the underwriting of any shares until
management has resigned

Facilitating Credit Provision and
Revitalization of Regional
Economies

- Providing two or more indicators to show the
status of contributions to the regional
economy
- Calculating actual or expected results during
the implementation of the management plan
- Describing the basic approach to smoothing
credit provision

Share Underwriting

- Stating the amount, content, and timing of the
underwriting terms

Source: FSA, n.d.
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The requisite information on underwriting terms were also evaluated, shown below in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Evaluation Strategy for Proposed Share Underwriting.
Category

Evaluation Strategy

Stock

- Type, total paid-in capital, number of shares issued, paid-in capital, issuing
method, and non-capitalized shares
- "the contents listed in each item of article 108, Paragraph 1 of the Companies
Act"
- the number of voting rights and percentage of voting rights of all shareholders
who have voting rights
- the right to receive the total allotment of shares and the right to request
conversion of those shares

Subordinated Bonds

- Total amount of bonds, interest rate, redemption method and time limit,
interest payment method and time limit, details of subordinated special
agreements, etc.

Preferred Investments

- Type, total amount paid, number of units issued, amount paid, method of
issuance and non-capitalized amount
- "Contents listed in Article 5, Paragraph 1, Items 2-4 of the Act on Priority
Investment of Cooperative Financial Institutions"

Subordinated Loans

- Borrowing amount, interest, method and term of repayment of the principal
and interest payments, details of the special agreement, etc

Source: FSA, n.d.

The application also required banks to submit their capital status, as well as balance sheet
information, for evaluation. While the Committee did not explicitly require increased SME lending
as part of the original application for capital injection, the Committee evaluated the plans against
this criterion before the amendment to the legislation in 2008 (FSA, n.d.; House of Representatives,
Japan 2004).
These requirements for management plans and capital status were radically eased after several
amendments (Figure 1). For instance, management responsibility is no longer strictly pursued after
the 2008 amendment. Furthermore, in the 2011 amendment, the government introduced multiple
exemptions of requirements for financial institutions that were affected by the Great East
Earthquake. Such exemptions included the requirement to set numerical targets and establish a
responsible management system. After the 2020 amendment, these exemptions from the
requirements eventually expanded to COVID-19 affected financial institutions (which are assumed
to be all financial institutions, according to Sakaguchi 2020).
As seen in the Appendix, preferred shares had mandatory conversion dates to common shares,
while trust rights ranged in period from 10 to 25 years, though the terms were potentially
extendable (DICJ 2020b). The beginning of the conversion period for the convertible preferred
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(1) If it contributes to maintaining the soundness of bank management,
(2) If it contributes to securing a repayment source of public funds,
(3) If it is in accordance with the purposes of the law, such as financial facilitating, on which
capital injection of public funds has been based (DICJ, n.d.).
shares also varied from bank to bank, sometimes as early as within a month (e.g., Kirayaka Bank
and Howa Bank), or more than seven years after the capital injection (Michinoku Bank) (DICJ
2020b).
After the capital injection, the conversion price is often calculated as the average of the common
equity (stock) price over the week preceding the calculation. The conversion price on convertible
preferred shares has a “floor price.” The floor price is often calculated as 50% of the average price
of common stock when the capital was injected to the targeted financial institution. There is no
“ceiling” price in the convertible preferred shares (Sakaguchi 2020).
After the 2008 amendment, financial institutions were given the option to buy the preferred stock
at book value, the equivalent to providing a call option for financial institutions. This option can be
exercised if the stock price continuously falls under the conversion price and if banks request the
JFSA to do so. Sakaguchi (2020) notes that the stock prices of many of the banks affected by the
Great Earthquake fall under the floor price.15
For preferred investments, so far, all the receivers have been Shinkumi Federation banks, in the
form of preferred perpetual investments (noncumulative corporate bonds). In terms of trust
beneficial rights, the trust period has been either 10 or 25 years, which is can also be extendable.
For those with 10 year trust periods, it is stipulated that within 10 years following the capital
injection, either “authorization of management improvement” or “authorization of capital
reorganization associated with business restructuring” will be obtained (DICJ 2020b).
In terms of capital with voting rights, the DICJ clarifies on its website that it can exercise its rights
as a shareholder and investor, considering three factors:
In addition, the DICJ pays attention to if its exercise of rights is consistent with administrative
policies and measures. However, available information doesn’t clarify to what extent the DICJ or
RCC have exercised those rights.

This is not only because the stock price of the Great Earthquake affected banks hover low, but also because the floor
price of those banks was arbitrarily set higher compared to non-affected banks (Sakaguchi 2020, 9). The floor price
adjustment is not mentioned in the ASFF Act legal text but rather implemented on the ad-hoc capital design basis.
Sakaguchi (2020) warns that the higher floor price may be functioning as the permanent subsidies for certain banks,
narrowing the exit of the program.
15
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12. Allocation of losses to existing stakeholders: ASFF did not seem to require any writedowns to the existing shareholders at the participating institutions.
No further detail has been found for this Key Design Decision.
13. Debt restructuring plan: The debt restructuring plan in the ASFF was to be implemented
according to the management plan submitted by financial institutions upon the
application of the ASFF.
There appear to have been no rejections of financial institution applications at any point, including
revisions to management plans after plan periods ended.
Each financial institution reports the ongoing status of the management plan, and the JFSA publishes
those reports annually on its website. Furthermore, if the management plan were to be revised, they
are rescreened and reexamined by the Financial Function Enhancement Examination Committee
(Financial Function Enhancement Examination Committee 2004).
The application also required banks to submit their capitalization status, as well as balance sheet
information, for evaluation. While the Financial Function Enhancement Examination Committee did
not explicitly require increased SME lending as part of the original application for capital injection,
the Committee evaluated organizations along this criterion before the amendment to the legislation
in 2008 (Financial Service Agency, n.d.; House of Representatives, Japan 2004). However, these
requirements in the management plan and capitalization status were radically eased after several
amendments (Figure 1). For instance, management responsibility no longer strictly pursued after
the 2008 amendment. Furthermore, in 2011 amendment, the government introduced multiple
exemptions of requirements for financial institutions that were affected by the Great East
Earthquake amendment. Such exemptions included the requirement to set numerical targets and
establish a responsible management system. After the 2020 amendment, these exemptions of the
requirements eventually expanded to COVID-19 affected financial institutions (which are assumed
to be all financial institutions, according to Sakaguchi 2020).
14. Fate of existing board and management: Initially, the government required the highest
levels of management to resign upon receipt of the capital injection; later amendments
limited the government to request members of the board or management to resign only
if the financial institution’s capital ratio was below 4% when the institution applied for
capital injection.
In the original, stricter version of management plans, the government required the highest levels of
management to resign upon receipt of capital injection. In addition, external board members were
required to be appointed if they were not already part of the board. Later, the government could
request members of the board or management to resign only if the financial institution’s capital
ratio was below 4% when the institution applied for capital injection.
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(1) If the recapitalized financial institution requests the selling of Preferred Stocks to third
parties (including sale in the capital market)
(2) If the recapitalized financial institutions request for repaying the public funds injected
(3) If disposing is strongly preferable under the given market conditions.
15. Exit Strategy: Some form of capitals (subordinated loans and preferred shares) have a
clear exit strategy, while injection in the form of preferred investments have no explicit
exit date.
Of the banks that participated in the capital injection program, five have repaid or repurchased
shares either partially or in full. Both Howa Bank and Kiyo Bank repurchased their preferred shares
within ten years of the capital injection. Under the extension made during the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy, two of the remaining 28 banks, North Pacific Bank and Kirayaka Bank, repurchased
their preferred shares. Only one bank in the subsequent extensions, 77 Bank, has repaid the amount
injected. (See the Appendix). As of the end of September 2020, the Japanese government had
¥684.04 billion capital injected, and ¥200.5 billion has been repaid so far, leaving ¥483.54 billions
the remaining balance.
In October 2005, the DICJ published “Immediate Guideline for Disposal of Preferred Stocks, etc.
Acquired through Capital Injection with Public Funds” and clarified the criteria for repayment and
disposal (DICJ 2005). According to this guideline, the DICJ will dispose the preferred stocks and
other capital under the following three situations:
Banks were expected to reacquire their shares within 15 years of purchase. In practice, the
mandatory acquisition date for financial institutions varied, with some institutions facing
mandatory acquisition dates within ten years and some firms facing mandatory acquisition dates
25 years after injection. Additional variation occurred in trust periods, with some firms receiving
ten-year periods and some firms receiving 25-year periods, though all were extendable (DICJ
2020b). For those with ten-year periods, the allocation required they receive an additional approval
for management plans. Injection through preferred investments have no explicit exit date, as each
preferred investment is a preferred perpetual investment injection.
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Appendixes
Appendix A : Details of the Preferred Shares (convertibles)

Which
ASFF?

June 2004
version
(original)

After
December
2008
Amendment

Injection
Name of Financial MonthInstitution
Year
Amount Rate
Kiyo HD
(Kiyo Bank)*

Nov-06

Beginning
of
Mandatory
Conversion Acquisition
Period
Date

Earthquake
impacted
financial
institution?

1-Oct-11

1-Oct-16

N

N

31.5

T + 1.15
(cap rate: 7.50)

1-Apr-08

To be decided by
the board of
directors on or
after April 2, 2020

Howa Bank**

Dec-06

9

1.84 (until March 2009)
6m JPY TIBOR + 1.20
(after March 2010

North Pacific Bank

Mar-09

100

T + 1.00
(cap rate: 8.00)

1-Jan-13

1-Apr-24

N

1-Oct-11

1-Apr-24

N

Fukuho Bank

Mar-09

6

1.90 (until March 2012)
T + 1.10 (after March
2013)
(cap rate: 8.00)

Minami Nippon Bank

Mar-09

15

T + 1.05
(cap rate: 8.00)

1-Oct-12

1-Apr-24

N

Michinoku Bank

Sep-09

20

T + 0.95
(cap rate: 8.00)

1-Apr-17

1-Oct-24

N

Jimoto HD
(Kirayaka Bank)*

Sep-09

20

T + 1.15
(cap rate: 8.00)

1-Oct-10

1-Oct-24

N

San ju San FG
(Daisan Bank)*

Sep-09

30

T + 1.00
(cap rate: 8.00)

1-Oct-12

1-Oct-24

N
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Towa Bank

Dec-09

35

T + 1.15
(cap rate: 8.00)

29-Dec-10

29-Dec-24

N

Bank of Kochi

Dec-09

15

T + 1.10
(cap rate: 8.00)

29-Dec-10

29-Dec-24

N

FIDEA HD
(Hokuto Bank)*

Mar-10

10

T + 1.00
(cap rate: 8.00)

1-Apr-13

1-Apr-25

N

Miyazaki Taiyo Bank

Mar-10

13

T + 1.05
(cap rate: 8.00)

1-Oct-10

1-Apr-25

N

Jimoto HD
(Sendai Bank)*

Sep-11

30

Funding cost as an
annualized rate of
preferred dividend ***

1-Apr-13

1-Oct-36

Y

Tsukuba Bank

Sep-11

35

Funding cost as an
annualized rate of
preferred dividend ***

1-Jul-12

1-Oct-31

Y

Tohoku Bank

Sep-12

10

Funding cost as an
annualized rate of
preferred dividend ***

29-Jun-13

September 29,
2037

Y

Jimoto HD
(Kirayaka Bank)*

Dec-12

20

T + 1.15
(cap rate: 8.00)

29-Dec-12

1-Oct-24

Y

Jimoto HD
(Kirayaka Bank)*

Dec-12

10

Funding cost as an
annualized rate of
preferred dividend ***

29-Jun-13

29-Dec-37

Y

Howa Bank

Mar-14

16

T + 0.95
(cap rate: 8.00)

1-Apr-14

1-Apr-29

N

* Names of financial institutions in parenthesis refer to the entities that effectively received capital participation.
** Preferred Shares with voting rights to appoint or dismiss directors.
*** Rates or dividend rates applied for capital participation based on the special measures concerning the Great East Japan Earthquake are
“funding cost as an annualized rate of preferred dividend” announced by the DICJ in each fiscal year, which is capped at 12-month JPY
TIBOR or 8%, whichever is lower.
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Appendix B: Preferred investments
Which ASFF?

After June 2011
Amendment

After
December
2016
Amendment

Name of Financial Institution

Injection
MonthYear

Amount

Rate

Shinkumi Federation Bank

Dec-15

10.6

T+0.32
(cap rate: 8.00)

Shinkumi Federation Bank

Dec-16

6.24

T+0.32
(cap rate: 8.00)

Shinkumi Federation Bank

Dec-17

10

T+0.35
(cap rate: 8.00)

Shinkumi Federation Bank

Mar-20

2

T+0.38
(cap rate: 8.00)

Shinkumi Federation Bank

Mar-20

7.2

T+0.49
(cap rate: 8.00)

Appendix C: Subordinated loan (10 years three months)
Name of
Which
Financial ASFF?
Institution

77 Bank

After June
2011
Amendment

Month
Year

Amount

Rate

Earthquake
impacted
financial
institution?

Dec-11

20

Funding cost as an annualized rate of preferred dividend*

Y

* Rates or dividend rates applied for capital participation based on the special measures concerning the Great East Japan
Earthquake are “funding cost as annualized rate of preferred dividend” announced by DICJ in each fiscal year, which is capped
at 12-month JPY TIBOR or 8%, whichever is lower.
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Appendix D: Trust Beneficial Rights
Which
ASFF?

Name of
Institution

Financial Month
Year

After
December
2008
Amendment

Shinkumi Federation
Bank
Sep-09
(Yamanashikenmin
Shinkumi Bank)*

Shinkumi Federation
Bank
Jan-12
(Soso Gojo Shinkumi
Bank)*

Jan-12

Earthquake
impacted
financial
institution?

Rate

45

Preferred
beneficial
T + 1.73
25
years rights out
(cap rate:
N
(extendable) of
trust
8.00)
beneficial
rights

13.9

Funding
cost as an
annualized
10
years
rate
of
**
(extendable)
preferred
dividend
***

Y

17.5

Funding
cost as an
annualized
10
years
rate
of
**
(extendable)
preferred
dividend
***

Y

Federation
Shinkumi

Reference
(for Trust
Beneficial
Rights)

Amount

After June
2011
Amendment
Shinkumi
Bank
(Iwaki
Bank)*

Trust Period
(for
Trust
Beneficial
Rights)

347

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

Shinkin Central Bank
(Miyako
Shinkin Feb-12
Bank)*

Shinkin Central Bank
(Kesennuma Shinkin Feb-12
Bank)*

Shinkin Central Bank
(Ishinomaki
Shinkin Feb-12
Bank)*

Shinkin Central Bank
(Abukuma
Shinkin Feb-12
Bank)*

8.5

Funding
cost as an
annualized
10
years
rate
of
**
(extendable)
preferred
dividend
***

Y

13

Funding
cost as an
annualized
10
years
rate
of
**
(extendable)
preferred
dividend
***

Y

15.7

Funding
cost as an
annualized
10
years
rate
of
**
(extendable)
preferred
dividend
***

Y

17.5

Funding
cost as an
annualized
10
years
rate
of
**
(extendable)
preferred
dividend
***

Y
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Shinkumi Federation
Bank
Mar-12
(Nasu Shinkumi Bank)*

Shinkumi Federation
Bank
Dec-12
(Gunmamirai
Shinkumi Bank)*

Shinkumi Federation
Bank
Mar-14
(Tokyo Kosei Shinkumi
Bank)*

Shinkumi Federation
Bank
Mar-14
(Yokohama
Kougin
Shinyo Kumiai)*

Shinkumi
Bank
(Kushiro
Bank)*

5.4

Funding
cost as an
annualized
25
years
rate
of
(extendable)
preferred
dividend
***

25

Preferred
beneficial
T + 1.24
25
years rights out
(cap rate:
N
(extendable) of
trust
8.00)
beneficial
rights

5

Preferred
beneficial
T + 1.07
25
years rights out
(cap rate:
N
(extendable) of
trust
8.00)
beneficial
rights

19

Preferred
beneficial
T + 1.00
25
years rights out
(cap rate:
N
(extendable) of
trust
8.00)
beneficial
rights

8

Preferred
beneficial
T + 0.89
25
years rights out
(cap rate:
N
(extendable) of
trust
8.00)
beneficial
rights

Federation
Shinkumi

Dec-14
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rights out
Y
of
trust
beneficial
rights
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Shinkumi Federation
Bank
Dec-14
(Shiga-Ken Shinkumi
Bank)*

Preferred
beneficial
T + 1.05
25
years rights out
(cap rate:
N
(extendable) of
trust
8.00)
beneficial
rights

9

* Names of financial institutions in parenthesis refer to the entities that effectively received capital participation.
** It is stipulated that within 10 years following capital participation, either (i) “authorization of management improvement” or
(ii) “authorization of capital reorganization associated with business restructuring” must be obtained.
*** Rates or dividend rates applied for capital participation based on the special measures concerning the Great East Japan
Earthquake are “funding cost as annualized rate of preferred dividend” announced by DICJ in each fiscal year, which is capped at
12-month JPY TIBOR or 8%, whichever is lower.
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